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Abstract
Human learning and intelligence work differently from the supervised pattern recog-
nition approach adopted in most deep learning architectures. Humans seem to learn rich
representations by exploration and imitation, build causal models of the world, and use
both to flexibly solve new tasks. We suggest a simple but effective unsupervised model
which develops such characteristics. The agent learns to represent the dynamical physical
properties of its environment by intrinsically motivated exploration, and performs infer-
ence on this representation to reach goals. For this, a set of self-organizing maps which
represent state-action pairs is combined with a causal model for sequence prediction. The
proposed system is evaluated in the cartpole environment. After an initial phase of play-
ful exploration, the agent can execute kinematic simulations of the environment’s future,
and use those for action planning. We demonstrate its performance on a set of several
related, but different one-shot imitation tasks, which the agent flexibly solves in an active
inference style.
1 Introduction
During the last decade, rapid progress in the field of deep learning has led to a number of
remarkable achievements in many fields of artificial intelligence (AI) [16]. However, human
learning and intelligence seem to work radically differently from the supervised pattern recog-
nition approach adopted in most deep learning architectures. Among many other things,
humans, for example playing infants, are able to learn from exploration and imitation, learn
from much fewer examples and create richer representations [28]. They can flexibly reason
over these representations and creatively elicit novel state configurations never seen before.
Here we suggest a simple neural network architecture which learns to represent the dynamic
physical characteristics of its environment in an unsupervised, exploratory way. By inference
on the basis of this representation the system can plan actions to reach externally given or
intrinsically generated goals. In the following, we summarize related work and outline the
proposed model.
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1.1 Related work 1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Related work
Impressive performance of deep learning approaches has been demonstrated in some classical
supervised tasks such as object [26] or speech recognition [18, 19], but also in unsupervised do-
mains including representation learning and learning generative models [17, 24, 42]. Recently,
"deep reinforcement learning" [30] has been demonstrated to achieve human or super-human
level performance on playing Atari video games from raw pixel frames.
Despite of all these achievements, studying deep learning might be less useful when it comes
to understanding human-like intelligence with the goal to create artificial general intelligence
[28]. Major issues raised include:
• Deep learning approaches are in essence model-free and require massive amounts of
labelled examples - orders of magnitude more than humans - in order to learn a complex
task [28, 40].
• In most deep learning approaches, the original problem is being re-formulated in a clever
way as a related, supervised task which can be tackled by deep multilayer perceptrons.
Hence the intelligent, creative part is done by the human designer, not by the algorithm.
• Deep learning approaches work on associations and cannot grasp cause and effect [38].
The first issue has been addressed in many ways with approaches summarized as "few-
shot learning" (for a recent review see [50]). Generally, a model is trained on a large body
of related tasks to learn an inductive bias or prior, which is then exploited to solve the task
at hand based on only one or few examples. Impressive recent achievements include one-shot
imitation learning in robots [9] and meta-reinforcement learning [49], the latter showing close
relationships to biological reinforcement learning [48].
Predictive processing (PP) summarizes a different class of approaches which during the
last years have gained much popularity [21, 7]. After seminal work by Rao and Ballard on
predictive coding in the visual cortex [39], predictive processing has been put on a sound
statistical formulation known as free energy principle by Friston and coworkers [11, 12, 13].
PP models view the cerebral cortex as a hierarchically organized prediction engine which
constantly tries to explain, i.e., predict, incoming sensory data as effect of hidden causes.
Successful prediction is suggested to cause the subjective percept. Hence, sensor signals act
as supervisory signals, and the brain’s internal states (hypothesized causes) play the role
of generative signals or inputs, which are adjusted such as to minimize prediction error.
Appealingly, prediction error minimization can also be achieved differently: by acting on the
environment such as to make the own prediction come true. This second mechanism is referred
to as "active inference" and represents the action generation mechanism suggested by the free
energy principle.
It is worth noting that in these models the term prediction refers to predicting the present
state of the environment, not its future [6]. The dynamic evolution of signals is addressed
implicitly by considering generalized variables (variables plus all their time derivatives) and
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predicting the instantaneous present state of those. In such a setup, to achieve highly perfor-
mant long-term temporal prediction, in particular higher temporal derivatives would have to
be known up to very high, maybe unrealistic accuracy.
Recently, Lake, Ullman, Tenenbaum and Gershman [28] formulated cornerstones believed
to be crucial ingredients of human-like learning and cognition, which is suggested to be more
model-building like than pattern-recognition like: (i) "building causal models" of the world,
(ii) "ground models on intuitive theories of physics and psychology", and (iii) "harness com-
positionality and learning-to-learn".
The authors state that in the approach of learning as model-building:
"Cognition is about using these models to understand the world, to explain what
we see, to imagine what could have happened and didn’t, or what could be true
and isn’t, and then planning actions to make it so." ([28], p.2)
Lake et al. [27] have developed "probabilistic program induction" as a model for few-shot
visual concept learning, which focusses on compositionality and learning-to-learn. Our model,
which we outline in the next subsection, follows a similar philosophy but concentrates on
intuitive physics and causality.
1.2 Outline of model
In this work we suggest a very simple neural architecture, which learns in completely unsu-
pervised fashion and incorporates several of the mentioned principles: it learns a model of
the dynamics of its environment by playful exploration ("intuitive physics"), can play virtual,
predicted episodes ("what could be true and isn’t") and can plan action sequences to bring
the environment closer to a target state that has either been intrinsically chosen as a goal or
has been given extrinsically by a one-shot demonstration ("planning actions to make it so").
The proposed system consists of sparse unsupervised networks, which in this work are
implemented as Kohonen-type self-organizing maps (SOM) [25]: a perceptual or state network,
which learns a representation of the environment’s states, an action module which represents
possible motor commands, and a sensory-motor integrating state-action network which learns
and represents associations between both (cf. Figure 1a). During "playful exploration",
the agent executes (e.g., randomly sampled) actions and observes resulting state changes.
Observing means that each active state-action unit learns to predict the environment’s next
state given the currently active state-action pair it represents. This mechanism discovers the
effects caused by the agent’s own actions1. For convenience, we refer to this architecture as
"state-action-prediction self-organizing maps" (SapSom).
In the proposed setup, playing virtual episodes or "kinematic mental simulation", for which
evidence has been found in human reasoning [23], corresponds to repeated prediction of state
1The authors are well aware that mere temporal order does not necessarily reflect a true cause-effect
relationship: the rooster crows before sunrise, but it does not cause sunrise. Nevertheless, the rooster’s crow
can be used to predict sunrise with a decent hit-rate.
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transitions starting from a virtual start state under a virtual action sequence. Here, the
term "virtual" denotes intrinsically generated states, which are represented by active units
without sensory stimulation and without action to be executed. This process of playing virtual
episodes serves to transform a virtual action sequence into a predicted sequence of states.
A goal is defined as a target state or group of states in latent state space. Action planning
corresponds to search in action sequence space, similar to active inference, such that predicted
resulting states approximate as good as possible a desired region in latent space (i.e., reach
that goal).
We provide a proof of concept using the Open AI’s gym cartpole environment. First it
is demonstrated that - in the interventional case - SapSom correctly learns to represent the
phase space structure of the cartpole system. This representation is identified as "intuitive
physics" here 2. We further demonstrate that SapSom can virtually play action-induced state
sequences which closely resemble the actual temporal state sequence provided by the environ-
ment. Action planning is then addressed by a one-shot imitation task: after presenting a single
episode with upright, stationary pole to the system (which is imprinted as target state set),
the system immediately balances the pole for a decent (though usually not infinite) number of
time steps. One-shot learning arises from the fact that, in the present architecture, imitation
is an inference rather than a learning process (for a similar philosophy, see [49]). Moreover,
the system is not fixed to optimally perform one single task, as in classical reinforcement
learning. For example, when primed with the goal to let the pole tilt to one side slowly, or
as fast as possible, SapSom sucessfully plays these games after only one demonstration. As
discussed by Lake et al. [28], this ability might come closer to human-level flexibility than
classical one-task reinforcemant learning.
The cartpole environment is very simple and the proposed system - in its present form - is
subject to several limitations. At the end of the paper we discuss how these might be relaxed
to result in more powerful architectures, and relate our model to biological findings.
2 Model
In this work we actually implement a reduced version of the model outlined in figure 1a.
The resulting simplified architecture is shown in figure 1b. Simplifications are: (i) no action
map is explicitely learned, which would maintain codebook vectors of motor commands. This
restricts the implementation to discrete finite action spaces, which is, however, sufficient for
the cases studied here. (ii) instead of a full sensorimotor map, a set of K action-conditioned
state-only maps is trained, where K is the number of actions. All maps share the same
perceptual (state) representation, but each map learns an individual, action-conditioned state
transition matrix. This prohibits dimensional control of the sensorimotor space, but makes
sure that all state action pairs are readily represented.
2We emphasize that this is not to state that intuitive physics is actually acquired like this in biological
systems. Most likely, evolutionary and prenatal self-organizational mechanisms [46] might play an important
role here.
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Figure 1: (a) Proposed network architecture. A sensorimotor self-organizing map learns to
represent state-action combinations, each represented by a state and action som, respectively.
An activated state-action unit learns to predict the most likely next state, sˆt+1 (brown),
conditioned on the current state and action, st, at it represents. (b) Reduced architecture
actually implemented for the demonstrations in the result section (for details see text). 1D
state and action representations are drawn for simplicity.
2.1 Representation learning
We wish to learn a sparse representation of the input space, because it is believed that this will
facilitate the learning of unimodal sharply peaked state transition distributions. As discussed
above, many powerful techniques for representation learning and even several possibilites for
obtaining sparse representations are around (e.g., [10]). Here we use self-organizing maps
(SOMs) [25], because in addition to sparsity they maintain topographic order in map space,
which may be useful in terms of predictive processing.
SOMs have been successfully used both in bio-inspired hierarchical representation learning
[29] and reinforcement learning [41]. To briefly summarize, in a SOM, neurons are geomet-
rically arranged in a regular grid (here 2D rectangular). Each unit at map location s ∈ R2
maintains a codebook vector w(s) with the same dimension as the input space. On presenta-
tion of an input vector or "environmental state" u, the winning unit s∗ is found, defined by
its codebook vector being closest to the input,
s∗(u) = argmins||u−w(s)||, (1)
where || · || denotes euclidean norm, and the notation on the left hand side of eq. 1 explicates
the dependence of the winner on u. The winning unit and its neighbours in map space learn
according to
∆w(s) = η hs∗(u)(s) (u−w(s)), hs∗(u)(s) = exp
(
−||s
∗(u)− s||2
2σ2
)
(2)
where h can be interpreted as a localized neural activation pattern centered around the win-
ning unit and σ is defined in eq. (3) below. The strong localization of activation entails that
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only a small fraction of units is active at every time step, resulting in a sparse code. The
learning rule eq. (2) brings codebook vectors of map neighbours both closer to regions of high
data density and to each other.
SOMs and predictive processing There is an interpretation of SOMs in terms of pre-
dictive processing: when considering the codebook vector of an active unit s as prediction
of the input, ||u − w(s)|| is just the prediction error in input space3, often referred to as
quantization error. Finding s∗(u) according to eq. (1) thus minimizes the input prediction
error by inference, and the learning step eq. (2) further minimizes it by learning.
Similarly to [29], we define a data-driven variable width σ of the activation pattern, namely
σ = σ0
mins ||u−w(s)||
means||u−w(s)|| , (3)
where σ0 has been empirically set to 25 percent of the map diameter throughout this work.
By this, for inputs that are well-represented with small prediction error, only a small neigh-
bourhood learns, whereas a large prediction error (maybe due to nonstationary statistics of
the input) causes a large portion of the map to rearrange to better represent this novel input.
The normalized activation pattern in map space can then be interpreted as recognition
density, where
p(s|u) = hs∗(u)(s)∑
s′ hs∗(u)(s
′)
. (4)
According to eq. (3), the recognition density is sharply peaked for small prediction errors and
more distributed for larger representational uncertainty. In SOMs, the generative distribution,
which denotes the likelihood of inputs given a map state, simply becomes p(u|s) = δ(u−w(s)),
δ denoting Kronecker’s delta. For a comprehensive treatment of generative and recognition
models, see, e.g., [11, 12, 13].
Finally, due to topographic order, prediction error in map space can be defined in geo-
metrical terms, simply as geometric distance between most likely true and predicted states,
respectively.
2.2 Prediction learning
During learning, the system will exploit the possibility to act on the environment and to
directly observe the consequences of these own actions on environmental state changes. Hence,
learning is situated at the intervention level of Pearl’s Causal Hierarchy and can be formulated
in the framework of Do-calculus [37]. Due to its similarity to how infants explore their
environment by testing the effects of their actions, we metaphorically refer to this style of
learning as "playful exploration".
3prediction in the sense of "predicting the presence"
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During playful exploration, the model learns to approximate the action-conditioned Markov
transition distribution p(s′|s, do(a)), where s′, s run over all state units and a runs over all
actions. For this, each action-conditioned state network, labelled by a, updates an individual
state transition matrix Ta with components Ta(s′, s) (for matrix operations, indices s′, s being
appropriately re-ordered as scalars), whenever a is executed. Let pt be the column vector of
probabilities p(s|ut), eq. (4), assigned to map states at time t in response to input ut. On
execution of action at, the environment changes to state ut+1 leading to a new distribution
pt+1. The state distribution predicted by network at, in contrast, is given by pˆt+1 = Tat · pt.
We adopt a simple least squares scheme and mimimize ||pt+1−Tat ·pt||2 with respect to Tat .
Gradient descent leads to the learning rule
∆Tat = γ (pt+1 − pˆt+1) pTt (5)
where γ is a learning step size variable and the superscript (·)T denotes the transpose of a
vector or matrix4.
2.3 Inference
After exploring the environment to a sufficient extent, inference can be done on the so-far
learnt representation using the state transition matrices. For example, given a certain start
map state s0, the system can generate virtual action sequences by activating action nodes
due to some schedule, without actually executing the corresponding motor commands, and
predict the sequence of states that would result from executing that sequence. Correlates of
this in human cognition might be kinematic mental simulation with the goal to plan actions.
Moreover, the start state might be virtually generated as well, instead of perceptually caused,
giving the possibility to elaborate on virtual scenarios never seen before, which might be
considered a kind of artificial creativity. We do not formulate an explicit neuronal model
of how state and action representations might be spontaneously generated, but there are
mechanisms and models of how this might occur spontaneously or in response to stimulation
[45]. In the present context, sequence prediction is referred to as "playing virtual episodes",
as this procedures accepts a start state and an action sequence and returns a sequence of
predicted environmental states.
Sequence prediction We explore two possibilites to perform one step prediction given
environmental state ut and action at. When "predicting by expectation", pt is determined
according to eqs. (1, 3, 4), and pˆt+1 = Tat · pt is computed. The expected next map
state becomes sˆt+1 = Epˆt+1 [s] and the expected next environmental state is given by uˆt+1 =
Epˆt+1 [w(s)], where E[.] denotes expectation. Note that this in general yields non-integer
"winner locations" sˆ, which should be interpreted in a population coding way [15] as the
estimated maximum of the activation pattern eq. (2) rather than the identity of a map unit.
"Prediction by mode" simply considers the winning unit, s∗(ut) and finds the most likely next
4Usually, the Kullback Leibler divergence between both distributions is minimized, but this is usually
tractable only under severe simplifications, which often lead to treatment of modes only
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map state as sˆt+1 = argmaxs′ (Tat(s′, s∗(ut)), resulting in uˆt+1 = w(ˆst+1). In order to avoid
deadlocks, prediction of the currently winning state is usually suppressed.
When the probability densities are sharply peaked, results for both methods become in-
creasingly similar to each other. Actually, we found that prediction by mode yields slightly
better results than prediction by expectation, therefore the former method is used throughout
the results presented in section 3.
A sequence of states given a start state u0 and an action sequence is predicted by consec-
utively applying one-step predictions on the basis of estimated environmental states, i.e., first
state uˆ1 is predicted from the start state u0 and a0, and each next environmental state uˆt+1
on the basis of uˆt and at. For prediction by expectation this means that instead of applying
multistep prediction of the density, pˆt = (
∏
t Tat) · p0, the result of each one step prediction
is collapsed to the expected next state, which is fed back to the system for each time step.
For prediction by mode, both procedures are identical.
Goals and action planning Sequence predictions can be used to plan action sequences in
order to reach a goal. This requires the definition of what a goal is in the present context.
We suggest to define a goal as a target state or a subset of target states in map space. Target
states might be provided by stimulation, e.g., by demonstrating a target environmental state
to the system, or might be intrinsically generated as described in the previous paragraph.
These target states are then imprinted or memorized, while the system tries to reach and
maintain them by executing a suitable sequence of actions. A biological correlate of target
state memorization might be persistent non-distractible neural activity found in prefrontal
cortex [14]. The described procedure is closely related to the following concepts: (i) one shot
imitation: imprinting the target state corresponds to the single demonstration of the goal,
reaching the goal is then done by inference over the learned intuitive physical model. (ii)
active inference: a system predicts a target state and minimizes prediction error by driving
the environment towards the predicted (i.e., desired) state.
A large body of reinforcement learning literature exists on how to find a policy p(a) = pi(s),
which specifies how actions should be planned in order to maximize reward. Here we suggest an
action planning strategy which does not rely on external reward signals but operates entirely
on the distances between target states and the current state. Actually, the drive to actually
try and reach an imprinted goal representation by active inference must in some respect be
generated by an intrinsic reward mechanism, which is, however, not explicitly modelled here.
Possible distance measures include (here euclidean) distance either between environmental
states, ||utarget − ut||, which is the input prediction error in active inference terminology, or -
because of topographic order - between map states, ||starget − st||, or both. We found action
plans on the basis of environmental state distances to work better than map distance for the
tasks considered here, hence the results in section 3 are generated using this distance measure.
Many distance-based action planning schemes can be imagined, here we use simple τ step
greedy forward search for action planning: On the basis of the true present state u0, find
the action sequence of length τ , the execution of which minimizes the distance between the
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predicted state resulting from that action sequence and the target state.
3 Results
The system was implemented using PyTorch’s tensor library5. For the experiments shown, a
16 × 16 SOM was trained and analyzed. SapSom was tested on the Open AI gym cartpole
environment (v0, for a screenshot of the rendered cartpole see figure 1b, inset)6. The envi-
ronment accepts two actions, push the cart to the left (a1) or to the right (a2) with a fixed
force, and yields four sensory signals, namely the cart location x, the pole’s angle with the
vertical θ and their time derivatives, i.e., u = (x, x˙, θ, θ˙). The system was originally designed
as a testbed for reinforcement learning systems with the goal to keep the pole vertical by
balancing, therefore the enviroment also returns a reward for each step and triggers a "done"
signal, as soon as the pole hits ±15 degrees, the cart hits the screen border, or 200 steps of
balancing are successfully executed. Throughout this work, the reward signal was ignored,
because SapSom operates in a completely unsupervised way. A sequence of steps between
cartpole initialization and trigger of the done signal is referred to as an episode.
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Figure 2: Directions of motion in the θ − θ˙ phase plane (arrows) for five complete random
episodes. Arrows are located at the states (θ, θ˙) to which they apply. (a) Blue: Real direc-
tions of motion in the next step as provided by the environment. Red: Directions of motion
predicted by the network when provided with the same state and action. Predictions approx-
imate real movements very well. (b) Prediction of motions in phase space under virtual left
push (blue) and virtual right push (red), respectively (for discussion see text).
5https://pytorch.org/
6https://gym.openai.com/envs/CartPole-v0/
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3.1 Intuitive physics
Here we tested whether SapSom could learn a representation of the environment’s Newto-
nian dynamics, metaphorically referred to as "intuitive physics" [28]. In technical terms, we
tested whether, after training, the system could approximate the real phase portrait of the
environment by its own predicted phase portrait. Results are shown for the θ− θ˙ phase plane,
because the pole’s behaviour rather than the cart’s behaviour is usually considered in the
cartpole environment.
The system was trained as follows: in order to assure correct unfolding of the map, the
SOM representing the input space was pretrained over 1000 episodes using a standard learning
scheme for self-organizing maps with exponential decays for σ and η between start and end
values (8, 0.1) and (0.3, 0.01), respectively. Subsequently, both representation and prediction
parts were trained simultaneously over 3000 episodes with σ0 = 4, η0 = γ = 0.05, as described
in section 2. Randomly selected actions were used during "playful exploration".
After training, the real and predicted dynamics of the environment were analyzed by
playing real episodes and determining the real and predicted directions of motion from one
step to the next. For a given phase point ut and next action at, the real direction of motion
was determined by executing at on the environment and calculating ut+1−ut. The predicted
direction of motion was calculated by applying ut and determining pt, then predicting the
next state sˆt+1 and corresponding predicted input uˆt+1, and finally computing uˆt+1 − ut.
Prediction by mode was used throughout the results section, because it operated slightly
more robust.
The real (blue) and predicted (red) directions of motion in the angle phase plane are shown
in figure 2a for five complete random episodes. Note that this phase portrait is not uniquely
defined, because at each point directions are conditioned on a, x and x˙. Real and predicted
directions of motion agree very well with each other. However, there are small deviations,
although in principle the cartpole physics is deterministic and should in principle be learnable
to arbitrary accuracy. The existence of small deviations is due to the state representation’s
quantization error: similar, but different environmental state trajectories will be mapped to
the same map unit, but will have slightly different time evolutions. These differences cannot
be resolved by the system. Where quantization errors become large (e.g. for novel states),
prediction errors can become large as well.
Figure 2b displays SapSom’s predicted directions of motion when planning to execute a left
push (blue) or a right push (red), respectively, for the same five episodes. The configuration
reflects correct "comprehension" of the situation: a left push generally accelerates the pole
to the right, i.e., angular velocity increases, which is correctly mirrored by the blue arrows
pointing upwards towards increasing θ˙. Under opposite sign, the same is true for right push.
We conclude, that SapSom can learn a reasonably accurate representation of the cartpole
dynamics only from interventional exploration. Because this is achieved in a completely
unsupervised way and without making explicit use of the equations of motion, this can be
understood as a way of capturing an intuition about the physics of the environment.
10
3.2 Playing virtual episodes 3 RESULTS
In the next two subsections, we present results about inference on this model. In order
to separate slow learning and inference effects, learning was switched off in the following by
setting η0 = γ = 0.
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Figure 3: (a) Screen shots of cartpole with identical start state followed by eight left pushes.
top: real time evolution. bottom: 8-step prediction of time evolution. (b, c): Real time
evolution (dashed) and predicted time evolution with same start state (solid) of x (b) and
θ (c). Blue: 8 left pushes; red: 8 right pushes; green: random action sequence of length
8. (d) Real (dashed) and predicted (solid) time evolution of a longer sequence of length 39:
oscillatory actions (3 left followed by alternating (6 x right) (6 x left) pushes). Major features
of motion are correctly captured in all cases.
3.2 Playing virtual episodes
Next we examined whether the trained system could virtually play episodes on the basis of its
intuitive physics, i.e., whether given an action sequence and a start state, the corresponding
future state sequence could be predicted reasonably well.
Results for a number of different scenarios are summarized in figure 3. The top figure 3a
illustrates by a number of screenshots, how the cartpole evolves under its true dynamics (top
row) and under predicted dynamics for the same start state and action sequence (bottom
row). Actions were eight left pushes. The bottom row images were generated by manually
setting the cartpole’s state to uˆt, rendering the environment, and then capturing the screen.
From visual inspection one may conclude that both sequences agree very well.
A slightly more quantitative analysis of prediction quality is given by plotting the time
11
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evolution of x (in arbitrary units as provided by the gym environment, figure 3b) and θ
(figure 3c) under true (dashed) and predicted (solid) dynamics. Blue traces correspond to
eight left pushes, red traces to eight right pushes and green traces to a random sequence
of actions (0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0; 0=left, 1=right). Although the coincidence is not perfect,
the general features of the resulting motion (shifting and tilting to the correct direction) are
captured quite well. Finally, in order to test the prediction performance on a longer and more
complicated sequence, the comparison was run under an action sequence of length 39, which
elicits an oscillation (Figure 3d). The gym environment initializes the cartpole’s start state
with small random numbers, resulting in a small positive initial value for θ in this case. As a
consequence, in the true dynamics (dashed line) a slowly accelerating tilt to the right under
gravity (drift of θ) is superimposed with the faster oscillation evoked by the action sequence.
The general behaviour (upward drift under oscillation) is correctly predicted by the agent
(solid line), even though the difference between the absolute values of real and predicted
angles increases over time. This increasing prediction error can be understood by keeping in
mind that, besides the action sequence, only the start state is available to the system (i.e., no
intermediate sync).
It may be concluded that, for the environment considered, SapSom can perform qualita-
tively and semi-quantitatively correct multistep predictions of the environment’s future under
a given virtual action sequence (usually generated by the agent itself). This encourages us to
test the system’s action planning performance when performing a task. Since in the present
system controling the environment in order to achieve a goal is an inferential rather than slow
learning process, we test SapSom on a set of one-shot imitation tasks.
3.3 One-shot imitation
A task requires a goal to be formulated, either implicitely (by reward structure) or explicitely,
by demonstrating one or a few success stories, i.e., examples where the goal has been reached.
Here we adopt the latter approach, which has the advantage that no sometimes complex
reward structure needs to be formulated. For SapSom, we define a goal as a target state or
set of target states in its state representation, which it has to reach and maintain. This target
state can be spontaneously generated by the system (intrinsic or curiosity-driven goal) or can
be imprinted from outside (extrinsic goal).
Here we formulate an extrinsic goal by presenting to the system a single sequence of
target states, which are imprinted into its map. Imprinting means that the corresponding
winning units are memorized as part of the goal. For example, if the goal is to balance
the pole, a sequence of states ut = (xt, x˙t, 0, 0), t = 0, 1, ..., T with upright stationary pole
under various cart states is presented to SapSom. Technically, instead of the true sequence of
states, we only present the vector of expected values, ug = Et[ut], and the vector of inverse
variances or precisions, pig, to the system (the superscript "g" stands for "goal"). For the
pole balancing example, when x and x˙ are allowed to vary strongly with zero mean, we obtain
ug = (0, 0, 0, 0) and pig ≈ (0, 0, 1, 1), where small precisions are omitted and large precisions
are capped to a maximum of 1. Reaching the target state then means to search for a sequence
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Figure 4: Time evolution of x (a, c) and θ (b, d) under four different tasks. (a, b) blue:
balancing; red: slow tilt to the right; green: fast tilt to the left. (c, d) keep-pole-tilted-
stationary task.
of actions, which drive the environment’s actual state towards the target state(s) and keep it
there. For simplicity, we avoid explicitly determining the distance between the actual state
and all target states, but instead use the precision weighted distance between u and ug:
d(u,ug) =
∑
i pi
g
i (ui − ugi )2. For action planning, one-step greedy forward search is applied,
i.e., τ = 1.
Figure 4 shows the time evolution of cartpole location x (4a, 4c) and angle θ (4b, 4d)
for four different goals given to the agent. The first goal (4a, 4b, traces in blue) was to
balance the pole, imprinted as ug = (0, 0, 0, 0), pig = (0, 0, 1, 1). The second goal (4a, 4b,
red traces) was to let the pole tilt to the right to achieve moderate final angular velocity
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ug = (0, 0, 0.2, 0.5) pig = (0, 0, 1, 1). The third goal (4a, 4b, green traces) was to let it tilt to
the left with very high final angular velocity ug = (0, 0,−0.2,−10) pig = (0, 0, 1, 1).
The final angular velocities were (0.57, 0.35, 0.40, 0.31, 0.33) for the moderate tilt case, and
(−2.57,−2.53,−2.46,−2.41,−2.58) for the rapid tilt case. The latter angular velocities are
about the maximum which can be achieved when pushing to one side all the time, which was
correctly predicted by the agent: All but one action over the five rapid tilt trials were "push
right".
Figure 4c and 4d illustrate how the system acts in a slightly more challenging task, namely
to keep the pole tilted to the right and stationary (ug = (0, 0, 0.15, 0), pig = (0, 0, 1, 1)). To
achieve this, the agent had to constantly accelerate the cart into the direction of the tilt in
a controlled way, such that the cart leaves the regime previously explored and learned. The
traces indicate that the agent manages to keep the pole steadily tilted over a considerable
number of time steps, although it does not quite reach the goal of θ = 0.15 rad but instead
stabilizes values around θ = 0.08 rad. Also, when approaching the screen boundaries, the
agent fails to stabilize any longer, beacuse this configuration is far from what it experienced
during playful exploration with random actions only.
In summary, we find that the system is quite flexible in solving different related tasks and
generalizes satisfactorily to previously unseen regimes.
OpenAI defines "solving" the cartpole problem as being able to balance the pole over an
average of 195 time steps per episode, taken over the last 100 episodes, where each episode ends
in case of failure or after 200 time steps otherwise. In order to characterize the performance
of the agent, we analyzed 100 episodes under the balancing task (Figure 4b, blue). We found
that 61 episodes reached the limit of 200 steps of balancing, the average number of time steps
was 188 steps. Hence, SapSom does not quite reach the definition for solving the task, but
comes quite close.
The results demonstrate, that SapSom can perform each of these tasks very well (although
not perfectly) after only one presentation of the goal state. This is possible, because task
solution is done via inference over the intuitive physics learned, rather than via slow modi-
fication of weights. Hence, in comparison with reinforcement learning, the presented system
provides two major advantages: (i) it does not need any extrinsic reward structure (which
has often to be engineered in a tedious process), and (ii) it can flexibly solve various tasks,
which would require both a new reward structure and retraining in reinforcement learning.
The latter flexibility has also been specified as an important feature of human-like learning
and performance [28].
4 Discussion
The goal of this work was to suggest a minimal model which shows important properties of
artificial intelligence: learning from experience, comprehension of its surroundings, reasoning,
planning, and flexible solution of different tasks. It does so by learning a representation of the
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dynamical physical properties of its environment by exploration, and by performing inference
on this representation to reach goals. The philosophy behind this approach is related to
the KISS principle and Occam’s razor at the model level: we identified minimal ingredients
which seem both plausible and important for achieving the mentioned properties7. The key
ingredients of SapSom are:
• An adaptive and sparse sensorimotor representation, in particular the possibility to act
on an environment rather than just observing, in order to learn by exploration.
• A temporal sequence learning and prediction mechanism at the sensorimotor level.
• A short term memory mechanism to store target states in state representation space.
• A mechanism to intrinsically generate action and state representations and to reason on
their temporal evolution on the basis of temporal sequence prediction.
• A distance measure between states. If reasoning is to be done at the representation
level, a distance measure between sparse state representations, such as a topographic
map, is required.
In the following, we discuss possible extensions of our model, and relate its mechanisms to
biological findings.
4.1 Possible extensions
A simple set of one-layer network architectures was used (in the full model, Figure 1a, a three
layer architecture) to learn an embedding of the input space. Both the brain and state of the
art representation techniques, in contrast, maintain hierarchical representations of modalities.
In our model, single-layer state representation learning can easily be replaced by hierarchical
self-organizing map structures [29], or by contemporary high performance approaches such as
(vector-quantized) variational autoencoders [24, 42], generative adversarial networks, [17] or
deep convolutional architectures in general (e.g., [26]), which might be trained on raw frame
sequences. A sparse representation at the embedding level, which is considered crucial for
temporal sequence learning, can be either directly provided by such systems [42], or can be
achieved by using a SOM or other competitive learning mechanism [10] on top of their output
or encoding layer.
SapSom’s temporal sequence learning mechanism is simply 1st order Markov, rendering it
somewhat similar to Hidden Markov Models [3]. Clearly, reasoning on environments of nat-
ural complexity requires variable (and sometimes very high) order Markov representations.
Hawkins et al. [20] developed a biologically plausible model for variable order sequence mem-
ory which is embedded in their hierarchical temporal memory framework. It is based on
lateral cortical connections operating on a sparse representation, where each state is repre-
sented by multiple model neurons. Their approach could be most naturally incorporated in
7There may be completely different ways, though, to generate the same behaviour
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our framework, but also other approaches for variable order sequence prediction can be con-
sidered without changing the fundamental way the model works [22, 40]. A different obvious
possibility to include sensitivity to variable length history is to use recurrent connectivity.
Recurrent SOMs [47, 29] can be trained to represent short sequences of input patterns instead
of individual states.
Besides being one-step forward only, action sequence planning is done simply by minimizing
the precision-weighted euclidean distances between current and goal environmental states. For
high dimensional state spaces, however, it is known that the euclidean distance can lose much
of its meaning [1]. Consequently, for high-dimensional spaces it might be beneficial to either
resort to other distance measures, such as for example the cosine distance, or to put more
weight on distance measurement in the topographically ordered latent space.
Another issue that is unresolved is how to stably establish a hierarchy of temporal timescales
which is clearly present in human reasoning. When related to biology, assuming a "temporal
timestep" within the brain of a few tens of milliseconds, all reasoning modeled here would
operate in the sub second range. Humans, in contrast, make hierarchical action plans over a
broad range from below seconds to years, and seem to compose longer term plans by abstract-
ing from shorter ones [23]. Hierarchical arrangements of RSOMs have the potential to model
a temporal hierarchy, however, for longer history the algorithm requires some parameter fine-
tuning and becomes subject to numerical instability. Temporal hierarchy might instead be
more stably generated when interlacing RSOM-layers with a novelty-driven gating mechanism
(Stetter, unpublished results).
In its minimal version, SapSom operates in completely unsupervised mode. It does not
evaluate any supervisory or extrinsic reward signals. The feedback used is sensory information
evoked by its own actions. Because there needs to be some intrinsic motivation mechanism
which drives the system to explore its environment, to try and reach goals, and eventually to
intrisically set goals, the present approach shows similarities with curiousity driven learning,
where intrinsic reward signals are generated based on prediction errors [36]. Humans, in
contrast, do use both extrinsic and intrinsically generated reward signals (e.g., [44]).
Reinforcement learning mechanisms can be incorporated in a natural way on top of the
sensorimotor representation, as SapSom - up to the reward signal - considers its environment
as a Markov decision process which it learns to approximate. The present approach therefore
shows a natural link with model-based RL [5]. Alternatively, Q-learning could use its update
rule to optimize a Q-value that is assigned to each sa unit in the sensorimotor map (cf. Figure
1). The resulting policy would then replace the greedy forward search algorithm established
here. Generally, however, finding efficient search strategies in action sequence space that
approach human performance in being creative and solving problems is an important ongoing
research issue.
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4.2 Relation to biology
Conceptually, our model ranges in the middle of the spectrum ranging from approaches that
deliberately abstract from the way the brain works [43] to computational neuroscience models
which put their main focus on how cognitive mechanisms are specifically implementated in
biological neural networks [8]. Our approach is to formulate computational models, which are
inspired by fundamental mechanisms of brain function, and are in principle compliant with
what is known about biological information processing. Accordingly, a few parallels can be
drawn between SapSom’s present implementation and the brain’s biological neural networks.
First of all, Kohonen’s self organizing maps are biologically motivated by retinotopy and
smooth feature maps found in the early visual pathway, by mexican-hat like lateral cortical
connectivity, and Hebbian learning. These aspects seem more closely related to biology than
an error backpropagation mechanism, for which no biological correlate could be found so far.
Moreover, SOMs have been used very successfully as models of self-organization in the early
visual pathway [32]. Given the observation that all areas in the neocortex are laid out very
uniformly and seem to perform similar operations [31], hierarchical systems of SOMs appear
to be good candidates of neurally inspired models at least of posterior neocortex.
The state transition matrices optimized during prediction learning can be interpreted as
lateral (figure 1b) or top-down (figure 1a) cortico-cortical connections. When doing so, the
learning rule eq. (5) just corresponds to spike-time dependent plasticity (e.g., [4]). For this we
recall that that map state probabilities p(s) are derived from normalized activations of state
neurons, eq. (4). When Ta(s′, s) is interpreted as connection from state-action neuron with
index s, a to target neuron s′, the learning rule reads ∆Ta(s′, s) = (pt+1(s′)− pˆt+1(s′))·pt(s, a).
the first term says that Ta will be increased, when s′ becomes active after s, a (stronger than
expected), and is decreased, if s′ is expected active but remains silent.
The basic structural and functional aspects of the present model can be mapped to neo-
cortical and subcortical structures and their putative functions. The sensory and motor
representations should be partly related to the corresponding representational systems of pos-
terior cortex. However, the most natural biological equivalents of the sensory, motor, and
sensorimotor model components (cf. figure 1a) might be situated in the prefrontal cortex
and basal ganglia complex. For example, in a spatial working memory task, neurons which
represent the cue ("sensory"), the planned response ("motor"), and the combination of both
("sensorimotor") have all been found in lateral prefrontal cortex [2].
Moreover, there is evidence that prefrontal cortex is capable of actively maintaining infor-
mation by robust, persistent neural activity, which, according to prominent models, might be
rapidly updatable by a striatum-driven gating mechanism [33]. The system comprised of dor-
solateral, anterior cingulate and orbitofrontal cortices, which interact with the striatum and
thalamus, are considered crucial for representing goals and context, generating action plans
and evaluating expected rewards thereof (for a review of data and detailled computational
models, see [34]). Hence, non-distractible sustained activation might be a neural correlate
of the model’s goal states, whereas their distractible counterparts might underly working
memory required during mental execution of the search through action plans.
17
REFERENCES REFERENCES
The intrinsic activation of action and state sequences (i.e., activating units without actually
sensing or acting) by repeated temporal sequence prediction is suggested here as a mechanism
for reasoning over the implicit physical model of the environment. This is in agreement
with the current view propagated in cognitive sciences, that cogitive processes arise from
co-ordination of cortical states already present in spontaneous activity ([35] and references
therein). Also, in psychological studies it has been corroborated that humans use the mental
simulation of short temporal sequences to create and test informal algorithms when mentally
solving abduction and deduction tasks [23]. No explicit neural mechanism of such autonomous
intrinsic activation is suggested in our model (instead activation and search is executed from
outside the core networks), but variations in the level of global spontaneous activity have
been shown earlier to have the potential to elicit and dynamically stabilize intrinsic cortical
activity patterns [45].
Learning more about the principles of this orchestration process of cortical states, or, in
SapSom terminology, learning about how search and prediction should be ideally designed
given an implicit world model, might lead to a better understanding of the principles of
human thinking in general – an exciting field for future research.
Acknowledgments
The authors wish to thank Monika Stetter for numerous valuable discussions on the subject
and Livia Scheunemann for helpful comments on the manuscript. MS was on sabbatical leave
joining the CIML Lab at University of Regensburg.
References
[1] Charu C. Aggarwal, Alexander Hinneburg, and Daniel A. Keim. On the surprising
behavior of distance metrics in high dimensional space. In Jan Van den Bussche and
Victor Vianu, editors, Database Theory — ICDT 2001, pages 420–434, Berlin, Heidelberg,
2001. Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
[2] Wael F Asaad, Gregor Rainer, and Earl K Miller. Neural activity in the primate prefrontal
cortex during associative learning. Neuron, 21(6):1399 – 1407, 1998.
[3] Leonard E. Baum and Ted Petrie. Statistical inference for probabilistic functions of finite
state markov chains. Ann. Math. Statist., 37(6):1554–1563, 12 1966.
[4] Guoqiang Bi and Mu-ming Poo. Synaptic modifications in cultured hippocampal neurons:
Dependence on spike timing, synaptic strength, and postsynaptic cell type. Journal of
Neuroscience, 18:10464–72, 01 1999.
[5] Matthew M Botvinick and Ari Weinstein. Model-based hierarchical reinforcement learn-
ing and human action control. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Bio-
logical Sciences, 369, 2014.
18
REFERENCES REFERENCES
[6] Andy Clark. Radical predictive processing. The Southern Journal of Philosophy,
53(S1):3–27, 2015.
[7] Andy Clark. Surfing Uncertainty: Prediction, Action, and the Embodied Mind. Oxford
University Press, 2016.
[8] Gustavo Deco and Edmund Rolls. Attention, short-term memory, and action selection:
A unifying theory. Progress in neurobiology, 76:236–56, 08 2005.
[9] Yan Duan, Marcin Andrychowicz, Bradly Stadie, OpenAI Jonathan Ho, Jonas Schneider,
Ilya Sutskever, Pieter Abbeel, and Wojciech Zaremba. One-shot imitation learning. In
I. Guyon, U. V. Luxburg, S. Bengio, H. Wallach, R. Fergus, S. Vishwanathan, and
R. Garnett, editors, Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 30, pages 1087–
1098. Curran Associates, Inc., 2017.
[10] Peter Földiák. Forming sparse representations by local anti-hebbian learning. Biol.
Cybern., 64(2):165 – 170, 1990.
[11] Karl J. Friston. Learning and inference in the brain. Neural Netw., 16(9):1325 – 1352,
November 2003.
[12] Karl J. Friston. A theory of cortical responses. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal
Society B: Biological Sciences, 360:815 – 836, 2005.
[13] Karl J. Friston. The free-energy principle: a unified brain theory? Nature reviews.
Neuroscience, 11:127–38, 2010.
[14] Joaquin M. Fuster and Garrett E. Alexander. Neuron activity related to short-term
memory. Science, 173(3997):652–654, 1971.
[15] Apostolos P. Georgopoulos, Andrew B. Schwartz, and Ronald E. Kettner. Neuronal
population coding of movement direction. Science, 233(4771):1416–1419, 1986.
[16] Ian J. Goodfellow, Yoshua Bengio, and Aaron Courville. Deep Learning. MIT Press,
Cambridge, MA, USA, 2016.
[17] Ian J. Goodfellow, Jean Pouget-Abadie, Mehdi Mirza, Bing Xu, David Warde-Farley,
Sherjil Ozair, Aaron Courville, and Yoshua Bengio. Generative adversarial nets. In Pro-
ceedings of the 27th International Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems
- Volume 2, NIPS14, pages 2672 – 2680, Cambridge, MA, USA, 2014. MIT Press.
[18] Alex Graves, Douglas Eck, Nicole Beringer, and Juergen Schmidhuber. Biologically plau-
sible speech recognition with lstm neural nets. In Auke Jan Ijspeert, Masayuki Murata,
and Naoki Wakamiya, editors, Biologically Inspired Approaches to Advanced Information
Technology, pages 127–136, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2004. Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
[19] Alex Graves, Abdel-rahman Mohamed, and Geoffrey E. Hinton. Speech recognition with
deep recurrent neural networks. CoRR, abs/1303.5778, 2013.
19
REFERENCES REFERENCES
[20] Jeff Hawkins, Dileep George, and Jamie Niemasik. Sequence memory for prediction,
inference and behaviour. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological
Sciences, 364(1521):1203–1209, 2009.
[21] Jakob Hohwy. The Predictive Mind. OUP Oxford, 2013.
[22] Steven Jensen, Daniel Boley, Maria Gini, and Paul Schrater. Rapid on-line temporal
sequence prediction by an adaptive agent. Proceedings of the International Conference
on Autonomous Agents, pages 67–73, 2005.
[23] Sangeet Suresh Khemlani, Robert Mackiewicz, Monica Bucciarelli, and Philip N.
Johnson-Laird. Kinematic mental simulations in abduction and deduction. Proceedings
of the National Academy of Sciences, 110(42):16766–16771, 2013.
[24] Diederik P Kingma and Max Welling. Auto-Encoding Variational Bayes. arXiv e-prints,
page arXiv:1312.6114, 2013.
[25] Teuvo Kohonen. Self-organized formation of topologically correct feature maps. Biological
Cybernetics, 43(1):59–69, January 1982.
[26] Alex Krizhevsky, Ilya Sutskever, and Geoffrey E Hinton. Imagenet classification with
deep convolutional neural networks. In F. Pereira, C. J. C. Burges, L. Bottou, and K. Q.
Weinberger, editors, Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 25, pages 1097–
1105. Curran Associates, Inc., 2012.
[27] Brenden M. Lake, Ruslan Salakhutdinov, and Joshua B. Tenenbaum. Human-level con-
cept learning through probabilistic program induction. Science, 350(6266):1332–1338,
2015.
[28] Brenden M. Lake, Tomer D. Ullman, Joshua B. Tenenbaum, and Samuel J. Gershman.
Building machines that learn and think like people. Behavioral and Brain Sciences,
40:e253, 2017.
[29] JeffreyW. Miller and Peter H. Lommel. Biomimetic sensory abstraction using hierarchical
quilted self-organizing maps, volume 6384 of Society of Photo-Optical Instrumentation
Engineers (SPIE) Conference Series, page 63840A. 2006.
[30] Volodymyr Mnih, Koray Kavukcuoglu, David Silver, Andrei A. Rusu, et al. Human-level
control through deep reinforcement learning. Nature, 518(7540):529–533, February 2015.
[31] Vernon B. Mountcastle. An organizing principle for cerebral function: The unit mod-
ule and the distributed system. In F. O. Schmitt, editor, Neuroscience, Fourth Study
Program, pages 21–42. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1979.
[32] Klaus Obermayer, Helge Ritter, and Klaus Schulten. A principle for the formation of
the spatial structure of cortical feature maps. Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences, 87(21):8345–8349, 1990.
20
REFERENCES REFERENCES
[33] Randall C O’Reilly. Biologically based computational models of high-level cognition.
Science, 314(5796):91–94, October 2006.
[34] Randall C. O’Reilly, Jacob Russin, and Seth A. Herd. Computational models of motivated
frontal function. In Mark D’Esposito and Jordan H. Grafman, editors, The Frontal Lobes,
volume 163 of Handbook of Clinical Neurology, pages 317 – 332. Elsevier, 2019.
[35] David Papo. How can we study reasoning in the brain? Frontiers in Human Neuroscience,
9:222, 2015.
[36] Deepak Pathak, Pulkit Agrawal, Alexei A. Efros, and Trevor Darrell. Curiosity-driven
exploration by self-supervised prediction. In Proceedings of the 34th International Con-
ference on Machine Learning - Volume 70, ICML 2017, pages 2778–2787. JMLR.org,
2017.
[37] Judea Pearl. Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference. Cambridge University Press,
USA, 2000.
[38] Judea Pearl. Theoretical impediments to machine learning with seven sparks from the
causal revolution. CoRR, abs/1801.04016, 2018.
[39] Rajesh Rao and Dana Ballard. Predictive coding in the visual cortex: a functional
interpretation of some extra-classical receptive-field effects. Nature neuroscience, 2:79–
87, 02 1999.
[40] David Rawlinson, Abdelrahman Ahmed, and Gideon Kowadlo. Learning distant cause
and effect using only local and immediate credit assignment. stat.ML, abs/1905.11589,
2019.
[41] David Rawlinson and Gideon Kowadlo. Generating adaptive behaviour within a memory-
prediction framework. PLoS ONE, 7:e29264, 2012.
[42] Ali Razavi, Aaron van den Oord, and Oriol Vinyals. Generating diverse high-fidelity
images with VQ-VAE-2. cs.LG, abs/1906.00446, 2019.
[43] Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig. Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach. Prentice
Hall Press, USA, 3rd edition, 2009.
[44] Wolfram Schultz, Peter Dayan, and P Read Montague. A neural substrate of prediction
and reward. Science, 275(5306):1593–1599, 1997.
[45] Martin Stetter. Dynamic functional tuning of nonlinear cortical networks. Phys. Rev. E,
73:031903, Mar 2006.
[46] Martin Stetter, Elmar W. Lang, and Adolf Müller. Emergence of orientation selective
simple cells simulated in deterministic and stochastic neural networks. Biological cyber-
netics, 68(5):465–476, 1993.
21
REFERENCES REFERENCES
[47] Markus Varsta, Jukka Heikkonen, and Jose del R. Millan. Context learning with the
self-organizing map. Proceedings of the Workshop on Self-Organizing Maps ’97, pages
197–202, 1997.
[48] Jane Wang, Zeb Kurth-Nelson, Dharshan Kumaran, Dhruva Tirumala, Hubert Soyer,
Joel Leibo, Demis Hassabis, and Matthew Botvinick. Prefrontal cortex as a meta-
reinforcement learning system. Nature Neuroscience, 21, 06 2018.
[49] Jane X Wang, Zeb Kurth-Nelson, Dhruva Tirumala, Hubert Soyer, Joel Z Leibo, Remi
Munos, Charles Blundell, Dharshan Kumaran, and Matt Botvinick. Learning to rein-
forcement learn. cs.LG, abs/1611.05763, 2016.
[50] Yaqing Wang, Quanming Yao, James Kwok, and Lionel M. Ni. Generalizing from a few
examples: A survey on few-shot learning. cs.LG, abs/1904.05046, 2019.
22
